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THE DEDUCTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION FROM BACK-PAY A WARDS 
UNDER TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits 
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 1 The Title applies to employers, 2 employment 
agencies, 3 and labor organizations. 4 If conciliatory efforts by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission fail, victims may bring suit in 
federal court. 5 In the event that the defendant is found guilty of a 
discriminatory employment practice in violation of Title VII, the court 
may order appropriate affirmative relief, including reinstatement and 
back pay.6 In the interim between the wrongful discharge and the subse-
quent judgment awarding back pay, plaintiff-employees often collect 
unemployment insurance benefits. 1 Federal courts disagree over whether 
these benefits should be deducted from back-pay awards. 
In Title VII cases, courts approach state unemployment insurance 
benefits in three ways. First, some courts deduct benefits from the back 
I. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-17 (1976). 
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a). For the purposes of the Act, "employer" includes any person employing 
fifteen or more individuals engaged in an industry affecting interstate commerce. For specific 
definitions and exemptions, see id. § 2000e(b). 
3. Id. § 2000e-2(b). 
4. Id. § 2000e-2(c). 
5. Id. § 2000e-5(f). The Commission has a certain period to file a civil action on behalf 
of the employee. After receiving notice of the expiration of this period, the employee has 90 
days to bring suit in his own behalf against the alleged discriminator. 
6. Id. § 2000e-5(g). Either the employer, employment agency, or labor union responsible 
for the unlawful employment practice issues the back pay. Id. The Act limits back-pay liability 
to the two years prior to the filing of the charge with the Commission. Id. 
7. Congress enacted the national system of unemployment insurance during the Great 
Depression. The program is partially funded by the federal government but is administered by 
the individual states. A payroll tax assessed against employers provides the major source of funding 
for unemployment benefits. The federal government initially imposes the tax, but an employer 
may offset up to 900/o of the tax by contributing to an approved state unemployment insurance 
fund. Each state has its own set of guidelines, supplementing the general federal requirements. 
Normally, an employer's contribution will be credited to a separate state fund account. 
When an unemployed claimant files for benefits, his past employment within a recent base 
period (usually one year) determines his eligibility and level of payments. The weekly payments, 
which usually continue up to 26 weeks, generally approximate half of the claimant's weekly earn-
ings, assuming full-time work during the base period. An "experience rating," which measures 
the employer's propensity for creating unemployment in the state, determines the rate of tax 
paid by each employer. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOY-
643 
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pay owed to the plaintiff. 8 This approach relieves the def end ant of 
the portion of the damages collected by the plaintiff in unemployment 
benefits. Second, some courts disregard unemployment benefits in the 
computation of back pay. 9 This approach allows the employee to re-
tain the full amount of back pay, as well as any benefits received in 
the interim. Third, some courts require that the employer or employee 
reimburse the state unemployment insurance fund as a condition of 
the award. 10 This approach leaves the plaintiff in the same position 
as if the court had deducted the benefits from the back-pay award, 
but does not relieve the defendant (employer, employment agency, or 
union) of liability. 
This Note argues that federal courts should not deduct unemploy-
ment insurance benefits from Title VII back-pay awards. Part I reviews 
the legislative history and purposes behind the remedial provisions of 
Title VII. Part I also presents the arguments that courts have advanced 
regarding the deduction of unemployment benefits from Title VII back-
pay awards. Part II assesses these arguments in light of analogous 
common law doctrine and the legislative objectives of Title VII, and 
advances arguments not yet considered by the courts. Finally, Part II 
concludes that federal courts should resolve this division of authority 
by not deducting unemployment benefits from Title VII back-pay 
awards. 
I. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE VII REMEDIAL PROVISIONS 
Courts finding Title VII violations may "order such affirmative ac-
tion as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, 
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ... 
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 11 Title 
VII also provides that back-pay awards should not include "[i]nterim 
earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence" by the 
plaintiff. 12 This provision does not affect unemployment benefits because 
MENT COMPENSATION: FINAL REPORT 8-19 (1980) (federal legislative history and description of 
the present program) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CoMM'N]. See also Federal Unemployment 
Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1976). These 
two acts establish specific federal requirements and provisions. 
8. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text. 
10. See, e.g., EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291, 1318-19 (N.D. 
Cal. 1979) (ordering plaintiff to repay benefits to the state unemployment insurance fund follow-
ing successful Title VII action), aff'd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). See also 
Mazurak, Effects of Unemployment Compensation Proceedings on Related Labor Litigation, 
64 MARQ. L. REv. 133, 170 (1980) (arguing that courts should order reimbursement of state funds). 
I I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
12. Id. 
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they do not constitute earnings; the employee does not perform any 
services in exchange for them. 13 Thus, the language of Title VII does 
not explicitly resolve the question of whether courts should deduct 
unemployment benefits from back-pay awards. 
Legislative history provides some guidance in interpreting the Act's 
remedial language. Congress enacted Title VII as part of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, thirteen years after the Supreme Court upheld the National 
Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) policy of refusing to deduct unemploy-
ment benefits from its back-pay awards. ' 4 Statements made 
in Congress upon the introduction of the bill indicate that the framers 
of Title VII intended the relief provided to resemble that available under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 15 This implicit endorse-
ment of the NLRB's established practice suggests that Congress an-
ticipated the application of a similar policy to Title VII cases. Moreover, 
had Congress advocated the deduction of unemployment benefits from 
back-pay awards, it could have inserted an explicit provision to that 
effect. 16 Although Congress added the section providing that back-pay 
awards should not include interim earnings or amounts earnable through 
reasonable diligence, it did not add a similar provision mandating the 
deduction of unemployment benefits.'' Thus, the early legislative history 
suggests that Congress did not intend courts to deduct unemployment 
benefits from back-pay awards issued under Title VII. 
The Supreme Court has taken an expansive view toward employee 
remedies under the Civil Rights Act and its 1972 amendments. In amending 
the Act, 18 Congress intended to fashion the most complete relief possible. 19 
13. See Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253 (1943). The decisions under Title VII 
support this interpretation. If unemployment benefits constituted "interim earnings" under the 
Act, such benefits would be deductible from back pay awards. Nonetheless, even courts which 
deduct unemployment benefits have not relied upon this argument. See infra notes 24-30 and 
accompanying text. 
14. See NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361 (1951). 
15. See 110 CoNG. REC. 6549 (1964) (Senator Humphrey, in his introductory remarks ex-
plaining the basic provisions of Title VII, said, "This relief is similar to that available under 
the National Labor Relations Act in connection with unfair labor practices .... "). See also 
I 10 CONG. REC. 7214 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark, reading a memorandum into the record 
which was in accord with the statements of Senator Humphrey). 
The NLRA protects the rights of the workers to associate or refuse to associate with a labor 
organization and seeks to encourage collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157 (1976). For 
these purposes, Congress created the National Labor Relations Board to adjudicate disputes and 
to issue appropriate remedial orders. Id. § 153. 
16. The NLRA provides for relief without any of the explicit limitations or required deduc-
tions provided under Title VII. Id. § 160(c). 
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
18. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103, 104 (1972). 
19. Senator Williams explained that: 
The provisions of this subsection [2000e-5(g)] are intended to give the courts wide 
discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible. 
In dealing with the .present section 706(g) the courts have stressed that the scope of 
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In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 20 the Supreme Court identified the 
dual purposes of this relief: to deter discriminatory employment prac-
tices and to make the employee whole. 21 Although the court in Albemarle 
did not comment upon deductions from back-pay awards, it concluded 
that Congress had modeled the back-pay provisions of Title VII on the 
corresponding provisions of the NLRA, 22 and that courts should deny 
back pay in Title VII cases only for reasons that would not frustrate the 
purposes of the Act. 23 Thus, Albemarle's interpretation of the language 
and legislative history of Title VII suggests that Congress intended a broad 
application of remedial measures. 
Nonetheless, a majority of federal courts have departed from 
established tort doctrine and have ordered such deductions. For exam-
ple, in EEOC v. Enterprise Association Steamfitters Local 638, 24 the 
plaintiff claimed a union violated Title VII by discriminating on the basis 
of union membership and related employment. Although conceding 
that the weight of common law authority denies deduction from tort 
damages of amounts received from collateral sources, 25 the Second Cir-
cuit chose to deduct unemployment benefits from the back-pay award. 26 
The court justified this deviation from established tort principles on 
the basis that neither deterrence nor retribution warranted the employee's 
enjoyment of a double recovery. 21 The court emphasized that it was 
"not in the business of redistributing the wealth beyond the goal of 
making the victim of discrimination whole. " 28 Most circuit courts29 
relief under that section of the Act is intended to make the victims of unlawful discrimina-
tion whole, and that attainment of this objective rests not only upon the elimination 
of the particular unlawful employment practice complained of, but also requires that 
persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful employment prac-
tice be, so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were 
it not for the unlawful discrimination. 
118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972). 
20. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
21. Id. at 417-18. 
22. Id. at 419. 
23. Id. at 421. 
24. 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 91 l (1977). 
25. For Title VII plaintiffs, collateral losses are those costs of sudden unemployment not 
recovered through a subsequent grant of back pay. These may include consequential financial 
difficulties, and emotional pain and suffering. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
26. Steamfitters, 542 F.2d at 591. 
27. Id. at 592. 
28. Id. 
29. See Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 F.2d I 161 (5th Cir. 1980); Ostapowicz v. Johnson 
Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Satty v. Nashville 
Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), modified on other grounds, 434 U.S. 136 (1977); Bowe 
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). With the exception of Steamfitters and 
Merriweather, circuit courts have not explained in detail the decision to deduct unemployment 
benefits. The Eleventh Circuit, though feeling itself bound by the prior decision of the Fifth 
Circuit affirming the trial court's discretion, has strongly criticized the deduction. Brown v. A.J. 
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and district courts30 ruling on the issue have similarly chosen to deduct 
unemployment benefits from Title VII back-pay awards. 
Recently, however, at least one federal court has cited analogous 
NLRA precedent to challenge the trend toward deducting unemploy-
ment benefits from Title VII back-pay awards. In Kauffman v. Sidereal 
Corp., 31 the defendant had discharged the plaintiff in retaliation for 
filing a complaint under Title VII. 32 The court refused to reduce the 
award by the amount of unemployment compensation received, 
observing that the Supreme Court - interpreting the NLRA - had 
specifically rejected much of the rationale underlying Steamfitters. 33 
Cases decided by the Supreme Court under the NLRA upheld the 
NLRB's discretion to refuse to deduct unemployment benefits from 
back-pay awards. In NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 34 the Supreme Court 
decision cited in Kauffman, the Court held that the NLRB did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to deduct unemployment benefits from 
back pay. Gullett did not establish a general prohibition against the 
deduction of unemployment compensation from back-pay awards, but 
held only that the NLRB had not abused its discretion in refusing to 
order such a deduction. In dicta, however, the Court asserted that failure 
to deduct unemployment benefits did not make the employee more 
than whole and that, because collateral losses did not increase damages 
under the NLRA, collateral benefits should not reduce the back-pay 
award. 35 The Court also noted that the state makes the direct payments 
to the recipients, and that the state issues these payments to mitigate 
the effects of unemployment and not to discharge the liability of the 
employer. 36 Although the issue in Gullett concerned abuse of discre-
tion before the adoption of Title VII, the Gullett rationale has proven 
influential in federal court decisions refusing to deduct unemployment 
benefits from Title VII back-pay awards. 37 
Gerrard Mfg., 695 F.2d 1290 (11th Cir.), reh'g granted, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) ll63 
(Apr. II, 1983). 
30. See, e.g., Marshall v. Communications Workers of America, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1017 (D.D.C. Sept. 24, 1979); Kyriazi v. Western Eiec. Co., 476 F. Supp. 335 (D.N.J. 
1979); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978); EEOC v. Kallir, 
Phillips, Ross, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 920 (1977); Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 346 F. Supp. 1301 
(S.D. Fla.), modified on other grounds, 348 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D. Fla. 1972). 
31. 695 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
32. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual for opposing 
an illegal employment practice or initiating Title VII proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976). 
33. Kauffman, 695 F.2d at 346. 
34. 340 U.S. 361 (1951). 
35. · Id. at 364. 
36. Id. 
37. See infra note 43. The Supreme Court's position seemed quite clear to some commen-
tators. See, e.g., Youngdahl, Deducting Unemployment Compensation from Back Pay: Erosion 
of a Rational Policy, 28 LAB. L.J. 587, 591 (1977) (expressing astonishment that the majority 
lower court view does not follow Gullett in Title VII cases). 
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The court in Kauffman also relied on Albemarle, 38 and indicated 
that because Congress had modeled the back-pay provisions of Title 
VII on the corresponding provision of the NLRA, identical procedures 
should be followed. 39 Furthermore, Kauffman noted that Title VII 
specifically provides for a deduction in back-pay awards for failure 
to show due diligence in seeking alternative employment. 40 Thus, the 
nondeduction of benefits would not operate as a disincentive to seek 
employment, because the plaintiff would be penalized for lack of due 
diligence. 41 Finally, the court emphasized that the state unemployment 
insurance agency could require reimbursement of the benefits if it so 
desired. 42 Unfortunately, few federal courts have adopted the Kauff-
man rationale. 43 
II. TOWARD A CONSISTENT INTERPRETATION: 
THE CASE AGAINST DEDUCTION 
The underlying purposes of Title VII - to provide adequate com-
pensation to the victims of employment discrimination and to deter 
discriminatory employment practices44 - mandate that unemployment 
benefits should not be deducted from Title VII back-pay awards. 
38. Albemarle, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
39. Kauffman, 695 F.2d at 347. 
40. Id. at 346; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
41. Kauffman, 695 F.2d at 347. 
42. Id. 
43. Only two other circuits have explicitly refused to deduct unemployment benefits in Title 
VII cases. Rasimas v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health, No. 80-1735-6 (6th Cir. July 28, 1983) 
(available Aug. 15, 1983, on LEXIS, Genfed library, Cir. file); EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 645 
F.2d 183 (4th Cir. 1981) (2-1 decision), rev'd on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 3057 (1982); cf. Marshall 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Gullett in holding 
that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to deduct unemployment compensa-
tion from a back-pay award under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA''), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976)); EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 624 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing 
Gullett and Marshall in refusing to deduct unemployment benefits from back pay under the 
ADEA). But cf. Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1981) (no abuse of discre-
tion in district court's deduction of unemployment benefits from back pay awarded under the 
ADEA). For a discussion advocating the deduction of unemployment benefits from back-pay 
awards under the ADEA, see Note, Set-Offs Against Back Pay A wards Under the Federal Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1113 (1981). 
Several lower federal courts have used the Kauffman approach in Title VII cases. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Riss Int'I Corp., 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,641 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Pedreya 
v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1979); Abron v. Black 
& Decker Mfg. Co., 439 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Md. 1977), modified on other grounds, 654 F.2d 
951 (4th Cir. 1981); Macey v. World Airways, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 111,581 (N.D. Cal. 
1977); Inda v. United Airlines, 405 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1975), modified on other grounds, 
565 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1007 (1978); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 
332 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971). 
44. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 412 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975). In discussing these statutory 
purposes, the Supreme Court held that back pay should be denied only for reasons that would 
not frustrate the purposes of Title VII. Id. at 421. This requirement implies that the employee 
must receive full back pay unless the reasons for making deductions would not circumvent the 
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A. Providing Adequate Compensation to the Victim 
Unemployment compensation is not a sufficient remedy for the ef-
fects of unemployment. Generally, unemployment benefits replace less 
than half of the recipient's former income. 45 Although the claimant 
may be forced to live on a substantially reduced income, financial 
demands such as rent payments, automobile payments, and interest 
on other long-term purchases will continue at existing levels. The claim-
ant may default on these payments, suffering the attendant financial 
and psychological consequences. 46 
Title VII does not allow the claimant to be compensated for these 
losses. Its remedial provisions do not allow for general tort damages 
or legal remedies, but only for equitable remedies. 47 Although tort and 
contract damages might not accomodate some of the consequential 
economic losses, 48 common law principles would sustain compensation 
for verifiable emotional damages. Conversely, Title VII specifically pro-
vides only for injunctive relief, reinstatement, back pay, and "other 
purposes of the Act. Otherwise, the courts could violate the spirit of the Albemarle rule by reducing 
the back-pay award to a negligible amount. 
45. See NATIONAL CoMM'N, supra note 7, at 15-16. Nationally, the average benefit replaces 
approximately 40% of the weekly wage of those workers covered by unemployment insurance. 
P. MARTIN, LABOR DISPLACEMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY 43 (1983). To the extent that unemploy-
ment benefits are not taxable, the percentage replacement of earnings is slightly higher. Id. at 44. 
46. See generally]. HAYES & P. NUTMAN, UNDERSTANDING THE UNEMPLOYED 64-82 (1981) 
(pointing to evidence of deterioration in physical and mental health as a result of unemploy-
ment); Schlozman & Verba, The New Unemployment: Does It Hurt?, 26 Pua. PoL'Y 333 (1978) 
(survey indicating unemployed suffer economically and psychologically even if they receive 
unemployment benefits); Friedman, The Grim Face of Unemployment, Detroit Free Press, Mar. 
13, 1983, at IB, col. I (Toledo's unemployed persons losing dignity, homes, personal property, 
and health). 
47. Title VII permits the court to require reinstatement, back pay, "or any other equitable 
relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Back pay, the only monetary 
relief explicitly available under Title VII, operates as an equitable remedy. Title VII does not 
provide for legal remedies, which would compensate the plaintiff for foreseeable financial damages 
and pain and suffering, as well as back pay. See Developments in the Law - Employment 
Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1259 
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Developments]; see also Note, Kyriazi v. Western Electric Co.: Damages 
for Sexual H(lrassment - Title VII and State Tort Law, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 657 (1981) (noting 
the limitations of equitable remedies under Title VII); Comment, Employment Discrimination 
Litigation: The Availability of Damages, 44 UMKC L. REV. 497 (1976) (arguing that, although 
courts generally view damage awards as legal rather than equitable remedies, courts should con-
stme Title VII as allowing full damages). See generally D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
REMEDIES §§ 2.1, 2.6 (1973) (outlining distinctions between legal and equitable remedies). 
48. See Developments, supra note 47, at 1260 n.351 (noting that remoteness might bar recovery 
unde·r either a contract theory of consequential damages or a tort theory of foreseeability); cf. 
St. Clair v. Local 515, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters, 422 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1969) (rejecting conse-
quential damages based on loss of a mortgage in an NLRA wrongful discharge case, and holding 
that Title VIJ's limitation of monetary damages reflected the desire to award consequential damages 
only when specifically contemplated by contract). 
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equitable relief" when appropriate. 49 Affirmative relief under Title VII 
will therefore not make the victims of employment discrimination com-
pletely whole. Thus, since Title VII does not allow recovery for all 
losses stemming from sudden unemployment, courts should not deduct 
unemployment benefits to prevent excess recovery. 5° To allow such a 
deduction would prevent the adequate compensation of the victim and 
frustrate one of the underlying purposes of Title VII. Indeed, even 
conceding that nondeduction may overcompensate some claimants, 
courts should err on the side of overcompensation in order to effec-
tuate this legislative purpose. 5 1 
Courts have often relied upon the analogous "collateral source 
doctrine" to support the nondeduction of unemployment insurance 
benefits from back-pay awards. Under this widely accepted doctrine, 52 
the plaintiff in a personal injury case may recover full damages from 
the tortfeasor despite reimbursement from a collateral source. 53 Courts 
usually consider independent or plaintiff-funded sources of recovery 
as collateral sources. For example, payments received from a private 
plaintiff-funded health and accident insurance policy would not be 
deductible from the damage award. The doctrine also applies to social 
security payments, unemployment benefits, sick leave, and pensions. 54 
Conversely, the doctrine does not apply when the defendant himself 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). 
50. See NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951); cf EEOC v. Pacific Press 
Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 676 F.2d 1272, 
1319 (9th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that "the collateral source doctrine evolved in part as recogni-
tion of uncompensated collateral losses suffered by discharged employees and . . . that [the 
employee) no doubt suffered such damage," but still ordering the plaintiff to reimburse the state 
fund). 
51. Nevertheless, in awarding back pay under Title VII, some courts have made an effort 
to ensure that victims are not made more than whole. See Merriweather v. Hercules, Inc., 631 
F.2d 1161, 1168 (5th Cir. 1980) (deduction for unemployment benefits "avoids any possibility 
of a double payment to a plaintiff"); EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 
F.2d 579, 592 (2d Cir. 1976) (discerning no reason of deterrence or retribution for allowing the 
employee a "double recovery"), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977). But see EEOC v. Riss Int'! 
Corp., 28 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 32,641 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (acknowledging Steamfitters' 
concern with possible double recovery by plaintiff, but noting that the employer would enjoy 
an equivalent windfall if unemployment benefits offset the back-pay award). Still, if anyone 
should benefit from a "windfall," it should be the wronged employee and not the discriminating 
employer. See generally Special Project, Back Pay in Employment Discrimination Cases, 35 V AND. 
L. REV. 893, 1013 (1982). 
52. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 47, § 8.10. 
53. See, e.g., Gypsum Carrier, Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1962) (refusing 
to reduce employee's damage award by unemployment and disability payments received from 
the state); United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1961) (rejecting government's claim 
that benefits received under the Civil Service Retirement Act should be deducted from a personal 
injury award under the Federal Tort Claims Act); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. 
Corp., 56 Wis. 2d 231, 201 N.W.2d 745 (1972) (applying collateral source rule and refusing 
offset for gratuitous medical services provided by the state). 
54. D. DOBBS, supra note 47, § 8.10, at 582. 
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has reimbursed the plaintiff or has provided funds for such purposes. 55 
For example, courts would not apply the doctrine to payments received 
from a joint tortfeasor in settlement of potential tort liability for a 
given injury. Rather, a court would off set these payments against any 
subsequent recovery for the same injury, regardless of whether the 
plaintiff had obtained a judgment against the same tortf easor who made 
the payment.'6 
Nonetheless, courts which deduct unemployment benefits from back-
pay awards assert that such benefits issue from a direct, rather than 
a collateral source. 57 These courts note that a payroll tax, paid directly 
to the state by individual employers, funds the state unemployment 
programs. ' 8 Thus, unemployment benefits represent direct payments 
from the employer to the employee for the specific purpose of mitigating 
the effects of unemployment. 
This theory, however, suffers from two significant flaws. First, the1' 
employer alone does not bear the financial burden of supporting the 
state unemployment insurance fund. Although only three states require 
that employees contribute directly to the fund, ' 9 such non-wage benefits 
clearly represent a labor cost to the employer and an insurance cost 
to employees. To pay the premiums for the unemployment insurance, 
the employee must forego higher current wages. 6° Furthermore, in the 
absence of a uniform state or federal requirement, employees might 
not choose to reduce current wages in exchange for income security 
to the extent they do under the present system. 61 
55. See, e.g., Yarrington v. Thornburg, 58 Del. 152, 205 A.2d I (1964) (tortfeasor entitled 
to reduction of damages for payments made to plaintiff through an insurance policy funded 
by the tortfeasor). 
56. See, e.g., Franklin Supply Co. v. Tolman, 454 F.2d l059 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that 
where full compensation had been received from one tortfeasor, plaintiff not allowed to recover 
same amount from another defendant). 
51. See, e.g., EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 591-92 (2d 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977). 
58. Id. 
59. The states are Alabama, Alaska, and New Jersey. Alabama charges employees only when 
the state fund dips below a minimum level. UNITED STATES UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SERVICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE LAW§ 205.04 (1982) 
[hereinafter cited as COMPARISON]. 
60. Wage theorists recognize that provisions for income security are not clearly distinguishable 
from wages. See 1. BACKMAN, WAGE DETERMINATION: AN ANALYSIS OF WAGE CRITERIA 92 (1959) 
("[U)nions have recognized that they could not always obtain both wage increases and nonwage 
benefits and that a choice must sometimes be made between the two alternatives .... "); see 
also L. BURGESS, WAGE AND SALARY ADMINISTRATION IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY 130 (1968) (workers 
seek to protect themselves against the hazards of unemployment through fringe benefits). 
61. Employees value a dollar of current income more than they value a dollar of income 
security. This is demonstrated by the early inability of state legislatures to enact unemployment 
insurance laws absent a uniform national system. Such laws would have placed employers in 
those states at a competitive disadvantage with employers in states not requiring contribution 
to an unemployment insurance fund. See NATIONAL CoMM'N, supra note 7, at 8. If, however, 
employees equally valued income security and current income, they would have been willing to 
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Second, viewing employers as the direct source of unemployment 
benefits proves troublesome because states do not issue such payments 
with the purpose of discharging the liability of the employer. Rather, 
such programs seek to mitigate the effects of mass unemployment. 
Moreover, the employer does not perform any significant function in 
the administration of these programs, lacking even the authority to 
determine whether benefits should be extended to a particular claimant. 
The state, under state-administered programs, pays the unemployment 
benefits directly to the employee. 62 
In addition, several cases in the law of contracts support the 
nondeduction of unemployment benefits from damages in wrongful-
discharge suits. 63 These cases have refused to allow employers the off-
set, on the basis that states establish unemployment funds for the social 
purpose of mitigating the effects of unemployment, not to diminish 
the damages of defendants. This analogous rationale buttresses the argu-
ment against the deduction of unemployment benefits under Title VII. 
B. Deterring Discrimination 
Title VII seeks not only to provide adequate compensation to the 
victims of employment discrimination, but also to deter discriminatory 
employment practices. 64 Deduction of unemployment benefits from 
back-pay awards may frustrate the deterrent goals of Title VII, because 
there is no assurance that the defendant will repay the amount deducted 
. to the state fund. This danger derives from the effects of state 
experience-rating systems upon an employer's motivation to repay. 
Under such systems, the state generally assigns a rating to each employer 
which reflects the employer's propensity toward creating unemploy-
ment in the state. 65 The state determines the level of the payroll tax 
charged to the employer based on this experience rating. Thus, if the 
accept a decrease in wages in exchange for income security, and net labor costs for employers 
would have remained unaffected. Cf. Note, supra note 47, at 669-70 (arguing that, if employers 
did not contribute to the unemployment insurance fund, the employee would demand higher 
wages to shelter against unemployment). 
62. See supra note 7. 
63. See, e.g., Monroe v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 114 Cal. App. 3d 804, 170 Cal. 
Rptr. 867 (1981) (refusing deduction for unemployment benefits in action for breach of employ-
ment contract); Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. 2d 858,211 P.2d 621 (1949) (unemployment benefits 
not deductible from employer's damage liability in wrongful discharge in violation of one-year 
contract); accord Century Papers, Inc. v. Perrino, 551 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) 
(holding that unemployment benefits are not deductible from damages for breach of employ-
ment contract); Sporn v. Celebrity, Inc., 129 N.J. Super. 449, 324 A.2d 71 (1974) (refusing to 
mitigate damages for a wrongdoer by deducting unemployment benefits). Cf. Pennington v. Whiting 
Tubular Products, 370 Mich. 590, 600-01, 122 N.W.2d 692 (1963) (suggesting, in dicta, that 
unemployment benefits need not be deducted from potential award on remand). 
64. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975). 
65. See NATIONAL COMM'N, supra note 7, at 18. 
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benefit disbursement, due to circumstances, has little effect upon the 
employer's experience rating, the employer will have no incentive to 
repay the fund. For example, non-employer Title VII defendants, such 
as employment agencies and unions, do not contribute to state 
unemployment insurance funds on behalf of their clients and members. 
Thus, their discriminatory employment practices do not increase their 
liability to the state fund. The deduction of unemployment benefits 
from the back-pay liability of these defendants simply results in a 
transfer of state funds to cover their losses .. 
The decision of the Second Circuit in Steamfitters66 presents a classic 
example of this situation. Steamfitters involved a defendant labor union 
with no experience rating with respect to the plaintiffs. The deduction 
of unemployment benefits reduced the liability of the union, thereby 
indemnifying the wrongdoer with state unemployment insurance 
payments. 
Nonetheless, proponents of the deduction of unemployment benefits 
argue that failure to deduct imposes too harsh a penalty on employers. 
Since most states base payroll tax rates on the individual employer's 
role in creating unemployment, failure to deduct benefit payments from 
back-pay awards may constitute a double penalty on the defendant. 
Still, the failure to deduct benefit payments does not necessarily im-
pose such a double penalty on employers. Although the failure to deduct 
unemployment benefits renders the employer liable for both the back 
pay and a worse experience rating, experience rating methods vary 
significantly from state to state, and many factual circumstances affect 
these ratings. The most common methods of experience rating reflect 
the benefit disbursements charged to individual employers. 67 Under these 
methods, any discriminatory discharge resulting in a benefit disburse-
ment will adversely affect the employer's experience rating. Some states, 
however, measure the experience rating by the periodic decline in the 
employer's payroll. 68 In these states, the discriminatory substitution 
of one employee for another would probably not affect the employer's 
experience rating. 69 
66. EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977). 
67. Thirty-two states use the reserve-ratio formula. Benefit disbursements charged to the 
employer are subtracted from the employer's payroll contribution for the year. The balance is 
then divided by the amount of the employer's annual payroll. This ratio represents the employer's 
experience rating. The employer can lower the tax charged to him by creating less unemployment 
in the state, and thereby raising this ratio. Under this method any payment of benefits charged 
to a given employer will adversely affect his experience rating. COMPARISON, supra note 59, 
§§ 220.01-.04. 
68. Id. § 220.04. Alaska, Washington, Utah, and Montana use this method. The payroll 
variation method measures experience rating by the quarterly decline in the employer's payroll 
as a percentage of the total payroll. Id. 
69. Since these states do not directly charge benefit payments to employer accounts, such 
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The effects of benefit payments on an individual employer's experience 
rating also vary according to circumstances. For example, many states 
reduce a wrongfully-discharging employer's experience rating if that 
employer is only one of several during the claimant's base period. 10 
Furthermore, if the employer already pays the maximum tax rate, 11 
an additional benefit claim will not affect his experience rating. Finally, 
a discriminatory refusal to hire cannot affect the employer-defendant's 
experience rating, because the state cannot charge the benefits to that 
employer. 72 
C. Protecting State Interests 
Arguably, in order to preserve the solvency and integrity of state 
programs, federal courts should deduct unemployment insurance benefits 
from back-pay awards. The nondeduction of such benefits increases 
the likelihood of overcompensation and imposes a burden upon a state 
agency. Therefore, courts might perceive the uniform deduction of 
unemployment insurance benefits as protecting the financial interests 
of the state. 
If the refusal to deduct is not unfair to the employers, however, 
it is certainly not unfair to the states. Courts in Title VII proceedings 
should not be overly concerned with the protection of state interests. 
Courts can conscientiously def er to state agencies in matters of the 
fiscal integrity of state programs, because all states have their own 
mechanisms for recovering benefit overpayments. 73 States have 
developed expertise in such matters by engaging in the daily task of 
dealing with unemployment and its effects. Although courts could simply 
order victorious plaintiffs to repay benefits to their respective state 
payments have little effect upon the discharging employer's experience rating. If the employer 
immediately replaces the employee, the discharge will not affect the rating. Montana modifies 
the formula by refusing to allow a reduced tax rate for employers whose benefit disbursements 
exceed contributions over the previous three-year period. Id. Even with this modification, however, 
discriminatory discharges will have little impact upon an employer's rating. 
70. Most states charge claims to employers in proportion to the amount of time the claimant 
actually spends during the base period working for the particular employer. See NATIONAL CoMM'N, 
supra note 7, at 19. The employers during the base period will share liability; the last employer 
will not necessarily suffer the worst experience rating effects. 
71. Federal law requires the employers with the poorest experience rating in each state to 
pay the maximum tax. Once an employer reaches this plateau, additional benefit payments can-
not force his contribution any higher. Id. 
72. See, e.g., Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 346 F. Supp. 1301 (S.D. Fla.) (ordering 
back-pay award because of employer's refusal to hire male cabin attendant), modified on other 
grounds, 348 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D. Fla. 1972). Title VII prohibits employers from refusing to 
hire, or from discharging an employee for discriminatory reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). 
73. See COMPARISON, supra note 59, § 455.01. 
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unemployment insurance funds, 74 such an order would frustrate the 
compensatory purposes of Title VII. Consequently, courts should 
subordinate the interests of the state to the interests of the victims of 
employment discrimination. 75 
Furthermore, not recovering benefits from Title VII, plaintiffs may 
not infringe on any significant state interest. For example, if the claimant 
did not cause the overpayment, some states merely deduct the over-
paid amount from that individual's future claims. 76 Other states permit 
the agency to waive recovery if the claimant did not cause the over-
payment and the recovery would off end equity and good conscience, 
and would def eat the purposes of the program. 11 These states may pro-
vide specific administrative criteria for waiver of restitution, and might 
not require restitution in many cases. 78 For the federal court to require 
automatic restitution denies the claimant any consideration under these 
criteria. Moreover, some states limit the possibility of restitution to 
a particular statutory period running from the time of the original pay-
ment of benefits. 79 Considering the often protracted nature of Title 
74. See EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 482 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd 
on other grounds, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Mazurak, supra note IO, at 170 (argu-
ing for forced reimbursement). 
75. Courts should not fashion back-pay awards in such a way as to frustrate the purposes 
of Title VII. See supra note 44. Cf NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 365 (1951) (holding 
that validity of NLRA back-pay orders should not depend upon the provisions of individual 
state unemployment insurance laws). 
76. See COMPARISON, supra note 59, § 455.01. 
77. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151A, § 69(c) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); cf. MICH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 42'1.62(a) (Supp. 1983). 
78. Pursuant to the waiver provisions of the Michigan statute, for example, the Michigan 
Employment Security Commission has developed several criteria for the approval of waiver. These 
criteria approve waiver in the following situations: 1) benefits were properly paid to a recipient 
of pension or social security payments, but were made improper by subsequent amendments; 
2) the Commission miscalculated or overpaid the benefit amount, though proper information 
was received, and the claimant has no reason to know of the overpayment; 3) wage information 
provided in good faith later proved to be erroneous; 4) extended benefits were made improper 
by retroactive amendments. MICHIGAN EMPLOYMENT SECURITY CoMM'N, MANUAL, part V, § 
793l(A). The manual also notes that new areas of waiver may evolve through the administrative 
process. Id. A claimant may file a request for a waiver on his own initiative. Id. § 793l(D). 
On appeal, the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review applies the administrative 
criteria, or simply waives restitution on the basis of the statute. See, e.g., In re Toro Hayes, 
Appeal Docket No. 882-06076-83576 (Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, Nov. 3, 1982) (since 
error was due to Commission miscalculation, Board applies Commission criteria to waive restitu-
tion); In re Robert Aeder, Appeal Docket No. 881-17419-R0l-82010 (Employment Sec. Bd. 
of Review, Oct. 8, 1982) (where claimant was required to repay due to previous administrative 
decision that he was not disqualified, the Board reversed and waived restitution without regard 
to the administrative criteria); In re Robert Shine, Appeal Docket No. TRA81-20475-81250 (Employ-
ment Sec. Bd. of Review, Oct 8, 1982) (where claimant questioned overpayments but payments 
continued, the Board required waiver without reference to specific administrative criteria) 
(all unpublished opinions of the Michigan Employment Security Commission). 
79. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.62(a) (1979) (limiting recovery to three years 
after date of improperly paid benefits); see also In re Ezekiel W. Gadberry, Appeal Docket No. 
881-12218-80138) (Employment Sec. Bd. of Review, June 14, 1982) (no recovery allowed after 
five years had expired). · 
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VII proceedings, so the period between the granting of benefits and the 
award of back pay may often exceed this statutory limitation period. 
Although states may wish to recover such benefits, 81 requiring the 
deduction of unemployment benefits from back pay awarded under 
Title VII might threaten even this state· interest. For example, many 
unemployment insurance statutes do not have procedures for recovering 
benefits from persons to whom those payments were not originally 
made. 82 Through the deduction of unemployment benefits, the court 
would essentially indemnify the wrongdoer. At best, this constitutes 
a questionable use of state funds. 
Finally, some states ignore court deductions from back-pay awards, 
recovering the benefits from the employee anyway. 83 In these cases, 
the plaintiff is assessed twice for the same benefits and receives grossly 
inadequate compensation. At least one state court, citing this inequitable 
result, has admonished arbitrators - and presumably courts - to 
remember this state practice when fashioning back-pay orders. 84 
CONCLUSION 
Congress designed Title VII to provide an effective remedy for 
employment discrimination. Although the legislative history does not 
explicitly indicate whether unemployment benefits were supposed to 
be deducted from back-pay awards, the analogous section of the NLRA 
does not require a deduction. If back-pay awards are to serve the dual 
80. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Co., 102 S. Ct. 3057, 3064 (I 982). 
81. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. CooE art. 95A, § l7(d) (Supp. 1982); MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 151A, 
§ 69(a) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); M1cH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 421.62 (1979); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 50-1325 (1977). 
82. Usually, state laws specifically provide for the recovery of benefits from claimants. See 
supra note 81. Conceivably, states might recover from third parties on a theory of unjust enrich-
ment, despite the absence of a statutory provision. See, e.g., State v. Rucker, 211 Md. 153, 
126 A.2d 846 (1956) (state recovered from an employer on an unjust enrichment theory after 
the arbitrator had already deducted unemployment benefits from the back-pay award). State 
recoupment is not assured, however, in the absence of a statutory provision. See, e.g., Hill v. 
Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 124 Ind. App. 83, 112 N.E.2d 218 (1953) (deny-
ing recovery for retroactive holiday payments made to the claimant after reinstatement, due to 
lack of statutory provision); Waters v. State, 220 Md. 337, 152 A.2d 811 (1959) (noting Maryland 
statute's lack of provision for recoupment from the claimant after back-pay award). The Maryland 
legislature reacted to Waters by amending the statute to allow the recoupment of benefits from 
the claimant after a back-pay award. See Katsianos v. Maryland Employment Sec. Admin., 42 
Md. App. 688, 402 A.2d 144 (1979). 
83. See, e.g., Meyers v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 341 Mass. 79, 167 N.E.2d 
160 (1960); Griggs v. Sands, 526 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn. 1975); Texas Employment Comm'n v. Busby, 
457 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). Both Griggs and Meyers cited Gullett in holding that 
the state could protect its interest by recovering from the claimant-employee. 
84. Griggs, 526 S.W.2d 441, 449 (Tenn. 1975) ("[A]rbitrators should take into account, in 
making back pay awards, the impact of unemployment compensation benefits previously paid, 
and the effect of reimbursement which may be called for."). 
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purposes of compensating discriminatory unemployment and deterring 
future discrimination, the effect of unemployment benefits should not 
be considered. The combination of back pay and unemployment com-
pensation does not overcompensate the employee for the debilitating 
losses of unemployment, and the state's unemployment assistance pro-
gram should not indemnify discriminatory practices. Furthermore, a policy 
of nondeduction leaves the states free to seek out instances of over-
compensation and correct them. Only by awarding back pay without 
regard to unemployment benefits can the legitimate interests of the 
employee, the employer, and the state be protected. 
Eric A. Martin 

